By Grace Ezekueme
Bola Akinterinwa is one of Nigeria’s most thoughtful commentators. When he writes, we listen. His 12 January article, reflecting on Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar’s defence of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and how it applies to foreign policy, was typically eloquent and, in such an uncertain world, timely and thought-provoking.
Akinterinwa said that he wanted “to explicate the nexus between France’s new controversy and Franco-African relations, on the one hand, and Franco-Nigerian relations and Nigéro-Nigeria relations, on the other.” He argues that contrary to Tinubu government policy, Nigeria’s national interest is best protected by partnership with Niger and others, notwithstanding their forms of government or what view France might take of such moves. What Niger and others might think or want, we do not know – or at least, in his short article, Akinterinwa does not say.
This is an important discussion to have. I am not sure how the discussion relates to the peg on which Akinterinwa seeks to hang it. As I understood Tuggar’s original piece “Foreign Policy and the Path to Peace in a Dangerous Neighbourhood”, the foreign minister was seeking to draw a distinction between the foreign policy principles that are enshrined in the constitution, and how governments, in a changing world, seek to uphold those principles.
That is to say: the ‘why’ of Nigerian foreign policy is written into the constitution; the ‘how’ of its delivery is where governments can properly be judged. “Many Nigerians,” according to Akinterinwa, “do not believe in the 1999 Constitution on which the Foreign Minister largely predicated his main arguments.” This seems more likely an opinion than a fact, and a specious one at that. Given the size of our great country, there may be many people on different sides of any range of issues.
But the point is this: in a democracy, we can argue the merits or otherwise of our constitution, and change it through due process. But it is confused and confusing to jumble up tactics and how policy is developed and delivered, with strategy and the objectives and principles that policy is meant to support.
This is an important distinction.
Akinterinwa outlines five categories of foreign policy principles but also notes separately that: “As provided in Article 19 of the 1999 Constitution, Nigeria’s foreign policy are also five in number.” Grammatical quibbles aside, this is precisely the point. Although the two sets of principles are similar, one is perception of precedent, and open to interpretation; the other is written into the Constitution. Unless and until the constitution is changed, all those sworn into office are obliged to abide by it. Akinterinwa is complaining about the taste of the policy apples when it is the constitutional pears he finds too sour.
Some might agree with Akinterinwa that “respecting international law is a wrong foreign policy objective.” Some may not. It’s a contentious position. But all should understand that respect for international law is what the 1999 Constitution says, and that a Minister elected to serve under the 1999 Constitution is under a certain obligation to abide by it.
[There is a similar lack of clarity on the right to self-determination, on which Akinterinwa also touches. The peoples of South Sudan and Eritrea indeed fought many years for independence. On the other hand, Singapore and Malaysia, Czechia and Slovakia, Panama and Colombia agreed settlements without recourse to arms. The Nigerian Constitution provides for the devolution of powers through a federation of states. That may not satisfy all interest groups. But everyone can recognise that South Sudan and Eritrea continue to face fundamental challenges with violence, denial of human rights and corruption.]
When I read Tuggar’s article, I understood his notion of ‘strategic autonomy’ to be a policy, rather than a principle – a means to promote the national interest and those core ideas written into the Constitution that Akinterinwa dislikes. Tuugar did not describe Strategic Autonomy as a new objective, but Akinterinwa says that is what it is. But Akinterinwa also notes that it is more or less the same as non-alignment, a policy, and one that is as old as independent Nigeria itself. As Tafewa Balewa explained, at its best, the policy of non-alignment is a flexible instrument to allow Nigeria the strategic autonomy to work with different partners in different ways at different times, but always in support of the national interest, as laid out in the Constitution.
Akinterinwa knows this, because he sees strategic autonomy as the device that should allow us to work both with France and our French-speaking neighbours, even when relations between France and our French-speaking neighbours are presently so difficult. “Nigeria,” he says “must also understand why many of the Francophone neighbours of West Africa are now against France.” It’s a fair point, but you have to hope that our well-trained and experienced foreign service professionals, security agencies and defence staff might already have been considering just this question, even before it was raised in a newspaper column.
When the French President Emanuel Macron said that Francophone countries should have been more grateful for the efforts made by France to combat violent extremism in the Sahel, he should surely have known it was a sentiment that would go down like a stale baguette from Bamako to Brazzaville. Perhaps he was playing to a domestic gallery in the ever more polarised European political scene; perhaps he was noting the conspicuous lack of success that Russian mercenaries have subsequently had at tackling violent extremism; or perhaps it was just a reflection of one of modern politics more enigmatic leaders. He did not say, so we will never know.
As Akinterinwa notes, a patronising and condescending tone has helped damage, perhaps fatally, a long and mixed historic relationship between France and former colonies. But he also should take care. Our “neighbours by contiguity are nothing more than a vacuum without France,” he says. Some, perhaps even many, in those countries might say it is a reflection that says everything they need to know about the attitude and tone of Nigeria and Nigerian intellectuals, whether or not they like France, America or whoever.
Tuggar says strategic autonomy means that Nigeria should balance conflicting interests rather than choose between them. Akinterinwa agrees, but says Nigeria should indeed choose a closer alignment with those countries closer to home. Tuggar noted that whenever Nigeria has reached out to neighbouring states, they have taken the olive branch and tried to beat us with it. These are things that we should continue to debate and discuss. We should be able to disagree, as indeed is normal and healthy in a civilised society – and reflect that these freedoms are easily taken for granted until they are taken away.
But the debate about how best to develop a policy to protect the national interest, including how we secure our borders, must be rooted in the rule of law and the constitutional framework. Long words or Latin phrases sometimes explain complex issues. Sometimes they are devices to hide behind those issues. Voltaire, the French 18th century philosopher, is often, if wrongly, attributed as saying, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” But with freedom comes responsibility. And that should be as much part of Nigeria foreign policy as every other aspect of the public space.
Grace Ezekueme is a Foreign policy fellow at the New African Dawn Institute NADI based in Lagos Nigeria.
